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United Nations in Korea showed the world that it is now run by law and
that the "peace-loving legally constituted world community":10 is no longer
proposing to engage merely in oratory. Two questions need explaining. First,
how can the United Nations show this when the book was written to prove
that there is no living law in the world community making positive lay.
possible? And second, how can this statement be reconciled with Professor
Northrop's later statement that the United Nations achievement was accom-
plished "more in spite of the law of the United NTations than because of it?"'31
Regarding Professor Northrop's proposed solution to the problem of peace
-make the protection of the living law of nations the major principle of world
law--one need merely express astonishment at the complete neglect with
which the realities of international life are treated and wonderment at the
absence of any mention of that clause in the United Nations Charter which
guarantees to the member states non-intervention in their domestic affairs.
This guarantee, it seems, contains the solution to which Professor Northrop
leads his readers by such a labored path.
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INCOME STABILIZATION FOR A DEVELOPING DEMIOCRACY. Edited by Mlax F.
Millikan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. Pp. xxi, 730. $5.00.
THERE has been much talk of late, backed up by goodly amounts of cold,
hard cash, about the need for a broader approach to the study of social issues.
Specialists in the social sciences, particularly economists, have Iheen roundly
censured for paying too much attention to their own little patches of knowl-
edge, thereby losing sight of the work going on in related fields. This
symposium, published by the National Policy Committee of Yale University,
endeavors to break out of the confines of traditional economic analysis by
applying an inter-disciplinary method of analysis to full employment policies
for a democratic society. The core of the book, a review of government spend-
ing, taxation, monetary policies, and other stabilization instruments, is essenti-
ally economic in its orientation, but in the first and last sections of the volume
a much broader frame of reference is used to consider the social repercussions
of full employment programs.
The advantage to be derived from crossing disciplinary lines in undertakings
of this kind can easily be exaggerated. The process of trying to reach a com-
mon ground between several fields is likely either to lead to conclusions which
are so obvious they hardly need defending, or to generalizations which have
nothing but the most tenuous relationship to one another. Contrary to the
30. P. 12; see also p. 15.
31. P. 267.
tProfessor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
current fashion, to approach a subject from three or four different points
of view does not necessarily mean that new findings of significance will emerge.
Success or failure depends on the nature of the problem under examination,
the capacity of the participants to draw upon work done in other fields, and
the ability of the person directing the undertaking to fuse differing viewpoints
into a single conceptual framework. As a pedagogical device, or as a way to
summarize and evaluate already known findings, the inter-disciplinary ap-
proach has much to recommend it, but, except under most unusual circum-
stances, its value as a research tool seems to this reviewer to be open to serious
question.
This book illustrates both the possibilities and pitfalls of this method of
inquiry. A study of economic stabilization policies in a society which seeks
to preserve democratic institutions, as well as a decentralized, competitive
economic system, involves questions as much political, psychological and
philosophical in nature as economic. Limiting the analysis to price-quantity
relationships is not only to oversimplify, but to misstate many of the problems
involved. Given heroic assumptions about the way producers and consumers
behave, it is easy enough to show how certain changes in taxes or government
expenditures will affect the level of economic activity. If we disregard effects
on institutions of government and the relative importance of public and
private activities, it is not too difficult to formulate a program which will yield
a specified level of output and employment. The really difficult issues come
to light only when we do not take these matters for granted, and stabilization
proposals are studied in terms of a broad social environment. This viewpoint
underlies the symposium; its appropriateness seems hardly open to question.
The rub comes (as inter-disciplinarians should know 1) when this promising
idea is put to the test. The difficulty is that when economists, political scien-
tists, law professors and the like--who think best and write best about their
own specialties-venture into other fields, the results are likely to be meager.
This poses a genuine dilemma: if the contributors stick to their own special-
ties, the book becomes just a collection of conventional essays arranged in a
somewhat unconventional (inter-disciplinary?) way; if they try to write about
their own field and others too, the chances of doing very well are small indeed.
These difficulties are many times compounded when, as in this case, there is a
large number of contributors, each limited to a brief essay. Two or three
scholars who can work together over long periods are much more likely to
fuse their thinking and to develop new and fruitful concepts than fifteen
scholars meeting with one another only occasionally. Methodologically speak-
ing, I think this is the main lesson to be derived from this experiment.
Some of these misgivings about cross-fertilizing the social sciences were
apparently shared by the contributors to this symposium, since few went be-
yond the traditional boundaries of their fields. Max Millikan's opening chap-
ter, which contains an admirable discussion of the major economic and non-
economic values in American society, differs from most of the others in this
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regard. He suggests two postulates which he feels underlie modern democra-
cies: the first, that public policy should be designed to help every individual
formulate his own set of goals and to satisfy his particular values to the great-
est possible degree, so long as nobody else is hindered from doing likewise;
the second, that commonly sought values should be shared or dispersed equit-
ably throughout the community and not highly concentrated in a single group
or class.
Borrowing from Harold Lasswell's Power and Personality, Millikan then
develops a set of objectives which give content to these two principles and
which are at the same time particularly relevant to economic policy. He con-
siders them under the following eight headings: income, power, respect, en-
lightenment (or educational advantages), skill, well being (in the sense of
both physical and mental welfare), affection, and rectitude. His discussion
touches on various aspects of our culture which economists, especially those
who see in increases in physical productivity the be-all and end-all of modern
existence, have been inclined to slight. Aside from passing references, how-
ever, Mlillikan does not consider whether or not there are any serious conflicts
between the economic goal of full employment and the major non-economic
goals of our society. He infers that this goal supports, rather than negates,
values such as respect, enlightenment and well-being, but he briefly notes
some interesting examples of possible conflict with the values of power (e.g.,
governmental encroachment on the prerogatives of businessmen), and recti-
tude (e.g., moral indignation over a continually rising public debt).
Millikan insists that other objectives within the economic sphere are
as important as minimum unemployment. Equally important are an ideal
distribution of jobs, consumer-guided allocation of output, an optimum rate
of capital growth and saving, a maximum level of technical efficiency, and
an optimum distribution of incomes. He concludes that primary reliance
should be placed on the private market mechanism, arguing "that in fact a
majority of Americans would agree that a primarily free and private produc-
tion and market system (in a suitably controlled environment) does the job
of allocation and technical advance well enough to justify its preservation." 1
Moreover, he feels that the private market mechanism is for the most part
well suited to achieving the non-economic value goals noted above, a consider-
ation which he believes deserves much weight in any appraisal of economic
policies.
At the same time, Millikan would not limit government just to the sphere
of economic stabilization; he sees an expanding role for direct government
action where private transactions have a strong "neighborhood" or third-
party effect, where effective competition is clearly unattainable, and where
government output (highways, public schools, etc.) seems to be the only
sensible alternative. He suggests that public decisions, as well as private de-
1. P.57.
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cisions, can be responsive to individual preferences, although he has his doubts
about the efficacy of the ballot box as a substitute for consumer dollar votes in
this respect. Millikan closes his discussion by asking how a program of eco-
nomic stabilization can be meshed with a system of private markets on the
one hand, and democratic checks and balances on the other.
Francis Coker's chapter is another essay which goes beyond the specialist's
usual terms of reference, since he endeavors to discuss the role of govern-
ment in economic affairs in terms of the total American environment. His
emphasis, however, is on traditional attitudes toward government regulation
in general, rather than stabilization programs as such. Coker does an effective
job of showing that the debate over governmental intervention in business
affairs is hardly new. Our intellectual heritage is a mixed one, in which mer-
cantilist notions have always played an important part. Even during the Nine-
teenth Century, when the dominant mood was certainly non-interventionist,
the demand for government regulation, both state and national, was very much
alive. During that century and on into the Twentieth Century, public accept-
ance of government activities increased as large corporations, big national
unions, and the other institutions of a complex industrial society emerged;
yet opposition to regulation continued and at present seems to be gaining the
upper hand.
Coker sees a case against many types of intervention on economic grounds,
but he takes a dim view of the notion that government interference violates
the American tradition or Christian morality. He argues for a discriminating
appraisal of individual government policies, observing that "there does not
appear to be much evidence that extensive economic restraints and aids by a
government lead, as a matter of course, to suppression of free speech and
assembly or to abridgment of rights of fair trials by the courts. ' '2 Hence, in
judging government stabilization measures, he pleads for a discriminating
kind of analysis focused more on individual measures and less on the eternal
verities. This is far from saying, Coker points out, that particular stabiliza-
tion policies are economically sound, much less that a particular proposal
is consonant with the non-economic values discussed in Millikan's essay.
The broad kind of questions raised in the Millikan and Coker essays are
hardly touched on by the other contributors. Each essayist adheres pretty
closely to familiar terrain, presenting a kind of capsule summary of what is
known by other specialists about his assigned topic. A reader who wants a
competent but brief review of what economists know about forecasting tech-
niques could not turn to a better source than Everett Hagen's discussion of
this subject. Similarly, Harold Lasswell presents a useful summary of the
methods for finding out what people think about the future, what they may
do about it, and, if danger signals are flying, how they might be persuaded




major instruments of stabilization policy are Gerhard Colm on fiscal policy,
Carl Shoup on taxation, Albert Hart on monetary policy, Ralph Brown, Jr.
on ways to influence private investment, and Robert Dahl and Charles Lind-
blom on public expenditures. Of this group of seven essays, only the last
can be said to draw on the methods and findings of more than one field, but
all are written in a well-balanced, vigorous style coupled with an awareness
of the complexities which any stabilization program in our kind of society
is sure to entail.
Without discussing each essay in detail, it is possible to indicate the general
viewpoint of the contributors and briefly to evaluate their findings.3 The tone
of the chapters dealing with the economic aspects of stabilization policies is
one of chastened Keynesianism. The essay which provides the analytical
basis for this part of the volume is Millikan's chapter on the determinants of
changes in national income. As a matter of fact, this is the only chapter which
deals explicitly with the causes of economic instability, so one has to read
between the lines of the others to determine just where each of the writers
begins his discussion. One gets the impression they feel that downswings
can be brought under control before anything like mass unemployment occurs,
but the authors seem to be less sure about controlling inflationary pressure
during upswings by any of the familiar instruments of policy. The longer
view is one of cautious optimism, the implicit assumption being that the forces
of secular inflation and deflation can be kept in check by the intelligent use of
corrective measures. A number of the contributors, particularly Cohm, indicate
that fiscal-monetary measures cannot be relied on to control long-run forces
of economic instability, but nowhere in the book is the reader given a clear
idea what the other measures for dealing with such long-run problems are.
In general, the contributors seem to subscribe to the view that to maintain
short-run and long-run stability available techniques will not have to be
pushed so far as to entail drastic changes in existing economic-political insti-
tutions. One can subscribe to this point of view, as this reviewer does, and
still wish that the contributors had made their reasons for adopting this benign
mood somewhat clearer.
While generally optimistic in their social outlook, the contributors to the
symposium are inclined to be quite skeptical when dealing with specific in-
struments of policy. Hagen, for example, concludes that government stabiliza-
tion policies cannot be based on even the most carefully drawn forecasts, for
the margin of error is just too great. His argument seems to leave us vith
the rather bleak conclusion that we cannot hope to forestall economic disturb-
ances, but only attempt to offset them. The fact is, of course, that we are going
to try to anticipate twists in the cycle whether our predictions are reliable or
not, and it would seem the wiser part of valor to use the most accurate (or
least inaccurate) kind of prediction we can devise.
3. Not discussed because of limitations of space are Victor Jones' essay on the
political framework and Thomas Emerson's essay on administration of stabilization policy.
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Harold Lasswell's discussion of public reaction-patterns to various economic
events and policies also throws cold water on the notion that attitudes can
be guessed in advance or that the behavior of consumers and businessmen
can be manipulated without resorting to totalitarian techniques. He makes
some intriguing proposals for using consumer attitude surveys to determine
business trends; certainly the most suggestive is his idea to utilize figures on
divorce rates on the grounds that "many women are aggressive in good times
who in hard times are afraid to assert themselves against an undesirable
husband." '4
Ralph Brown's essay examines the possibility of checking undesired fluctu-
ations in private investment by means of government tax, loan, and subsidy
policies. He eschews any flat conclusions, but his findings are mostly negative,
if not downright pessimistic. Brown expresses the rather plaintive wish
that public lending agencies in the fields of agriculture, housing, and small
business could somehow be coordinated to take into account overall investment
levels, since at present these agencies minister primarily to the long-term credit
needs (fancied or real) of a miscellany of special groups. Similarly, most pro-
posals to alter taxes which bear on investment have to do with reforms of the tax
structure and therefore lack the flexibity necessary for counter-cyclical action.
Towards the end of his essay Brown gives considerable attention to stabilizing
investment through a system of granting or withholding subsidies, but after
his review of all the pitfalls besetting such schemes, this reviewer, at least,
concludes that our salvation does not lie along this route.
In discussing monetary policy, Albert Hart is able to muster some en-
thusiasm for using central bank-Treasury instruments to maintain stability,
but his main point turns out to be that bank credit should no longer be per-
mitted to act as a destabilizing influence! He accepts, quite uncritically, the
argument that "capital rationing" rules of the banks greatly enhance the
importance of monetary policy, and he comes out strongly for a system of
secondary reserve requirements which would virtually remove credit creation
powers from the commercial banks. Unfortunately, Hart apparently observed
the first deadline set by the editor of the symposium, finishing his paper in
early 1949, with the result that he does not give adequate attention to develop-
ments in the monetary field since 1950.
Judging from these essays, success or failure of a stabilization program
depends in the last analysis on government tax and expenditure policies. Yet
the three chapters dealing with fiscal policy leave anything but an optimistic
impression. Gerhard Cohn's broad review of fiscal policy over the past twenty
years almost becomes an enumeration of the obstacles besetting such measures-
unwieldly budget-making procedures, balky legislators, the impact of huge
defense expenditures, the one-way pressures of powerful producer interests.




various tax measures, as do Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom in their
essay on public expenditures. All of this makes rather sober reading for
anyone who thinks of fiscal policy as capitalism's key to the stabilization
riddle.
One of the main sources of the general mood of foreboding in this part of
the volume is the threat of wage-inflation induced by union pressures. It is
interesting to note, therefore, that Charles Lindblom who wrote a hair-raising
account of union activities a few years ago-Unions and Capitalism-
adopts a good deal milder tone here. In fact, he comes up with the thicldy-
hedged conclusion that there are no grounds for either accepting or rejecting
the view that unions will jeopardize income and employment stability. None-
theless, he still feels steps should be taken to keep the unions within economic
bounds. Lindblom would have no truck either with those who want to atomize
collective bargaining ("unionism performs many useful functions") G or those
who want to unify union power at the top ("may simply aggravate the already
existing problems of 'groupism' ").G To his mind, the chief hope in winning
the unions over to a broader view of their responsibilities lies in a variety
of government strategies including earnest efforts to protect the value of the
dollar, subsidy programs for low income groups (to deflect workers from
expecting too much from collective bargaining agreements !), "experiments"
in compulsory arbitration in railroads and other public utilities, the elimina-
tion of the "ill-considered and unnecessary restraints on unionism which
characterize much of the Taft-Hartle Act,' 7 and a continual barrage of gov-
ernment pronouncements directed at union leaders, emphasizing the public
welfare aspect of their wage decisions. If these measures are unsuccessful,
he sees no alternative but to establish government regulation over wage
changes and probably over price changes too.
In light of the pessimistic tone pervading the main part of the book, the
sunny view reflected in Eugene Rostow's spirited evaluation of the competitive
market mechanism and Paul Samuelson's sparkling essay on the relation be-
tween full employment and other economic goals comes as something of a
surprise. Rostow sees the road ahead straight and clear; he smites out
mightily, first at those who would rely on price-wage flexibility as a means
for ending a major decline in business activity, then at those who argue that
monopolistic pricing is a constructive factor in a downswing. Nor does he
see any grounds for putting our trust in the private market mechanism in
periods of boom or overfull employment. In any case, aggregate spending
is so far out of line that the private market mechanism cannot be expected
to right itself, and our fiscal-monetary artillery has to be wheeled into action.
It is during the in-between periods of recovery and "stable prosperity" that
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market mechanism. Indeed, in line with the other contributors to the volume,
Rostow argues that competitive pricing is essential to growth and to keeping
our economy adaptable to changing needs. At no point, however, does lie
suggest that there may be difficulties in moving from a government-slanted
to a business-slanted economy and back again, a feat which in the light of
recent experience may be counted on to take some doing.
Samuelson's essay assumes at the outset that cyclical stability is somehow
achieved by conventional stabilization techniques; his optimism is thus built
into his analysis. Because of adverse effects on labor, management and re-
source efficiency, he sees some net loss in physical productivity if we stabilize
unemployment too close to zero; yet on balance he believes full employment
will make it easier to reach such goals as national security, optimum allocation
of resources, and a more equitable distribution of income. He argues elo-
quently, if somewhat superficially, that government decisions to spend, loan,
produce or control can be highly responsive to peoples' preferences much as
are decisions reached under competitive conditions in private markets. This
implies that our administrative-legislative machinery is a good deal more selec-
tive and adaptable to varying needs than most observers would be willing to
concede.
In the latter part of his essay Samuelson considers whether or not the
maintenance of full employment will lead to general resistance to change and
thus cut off long-term economic growth. He is rather skeptical about the
notion that technological growth can only occur in an environment of cyclical
instability. Rather, he leans to the position that venture capital would be
encouraged if "businessmen could look forward to a steadily growing market
not prone to sudden epidemics of general bankruptcy and insecurity."8 In
any event, he argues, growth of technological knowledge, not mere accumula-
tion of capital, is the chief factor in economic progress. Samuelson then
proceeds to demolish the view that we are fated to have either too much or
too little capital growth. He says:
"High employment can be achieved, theoretically, with almost any
pattern of investment and consumption. If individuals are trying
to save so much that their efforts threaten to become abortive through
a fall in employment, this can be offset by policy and high employ-
ment can be maintained. If the resulting pattern of employment
involves too little capital formation according to some prescribed
standards, there exist other combinations of policy measures that will
result in a more rapidly growing stock of capital. As an example, we
could have full employment with money so cheap and plentiful as to
be conducive to private capital formation, but with a federal budget
strongly overbalanced to curb inflation; or, if we wish it, present
consumption standards may be higher, with private investment ex-
penditure being limited by a tight money market that rations out





This is a heartening view which, one hopes, is not just a pipe dream. Its
vralidity depends on whether or not the forces producing instability are
amenable to the instruments of stabilization policy discussed elsewhere in
the volume. If these forces prove to be as deep-seated as they appear to have
been in the past, there is little in this symposium which would lend credence
to Samuelson's rosy view of the future.
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THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS: HIS POLITICAL POWERS
AND PRACTICE. By Stephen MI. Schwebel. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1952. Pp. xii, 299. $4.75.
MR. SC IWEBEL'S study, The Sccrctary,-Gcncral of the United Nations, is a
concise reminder of the close association between an institution and a man
molding it. The juxtaposition of the Secretary-General's powers under Article
99 of the Charter with their practical implementation reveals the considerable
growth of his actual powers. lr. Lie's unmistakable imprint on this growth is
well established by the author's exhaustive analysis of the Secretary-General's
relationship with, and participation in, the main United Nations bodies. The
Secretary-General has rarely failed to bring the weight of his office to bear
upon the policy formulation of the United Nations. This influence is evi-
denced in the Secretary-General's annual report to the General Vstembly, a
report required by Article 98 and gradually seized upon by Mr. Lie as a con-
venient instrument for outlining a rational United Nations' policy. It is also
seen in proposals submitted on the Secretary-General's own initiative, or his
participation in drafting resolutions or preparing the Secretariat's working
papers or legal memoranda. The Secretary-General's political power is most
evident in Article 99, which authorizes him to "bring to the attention of the
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the mainten-
ance of international peace and security." On the occasion of the North
Korean aggression, the Secretary-General virtually invoked this authority in
his introductory statement before the emergency session of the Security Coun-
cil.
It would be the blindest folly to consider the Secretary-General as a mere
administrator. "This is a political job," asserted Mr. Hammarskjold recently;
"I am a political servant. Administration is just a tool put at my command."'
The Secretary-General's political importance was reflected in the protracted
debates on Mr. Lie's successor and is fully elaborated and documented by Mr.
Schwebel's present study.
iProfessor of Economics, Svarthmore College.
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